![]() ![]() ![]() Weber’s definition of statehood appears to be based upon or at least tolerant of legal positivism. The important point of departure between Weber’s and Anglo-American contract based conceptions of sovereignty is the foundation of individuals’ rights. It therefore seems impossible to assert that acts of state cannot be acts of terrorism on the basis of Weber’s conception of sovereignty his definition simply doesn’t address the issue of terrorism, state or otherwise.Ĭontrasting Weber’s explicit definition of state sovereignty to implicit Anglo-American ideas is helpful in this context. Accepting Weber’s assertion that states have a monopoly on legitimate violence does not mean all violence the state undertakes is legitimate – if leaders use violence in violation of the laws or customs of that society then the people cannot be presumed to consent to it, providing both normative and practical difficulties. What is crucial here is that according to Weber law and custom circumscribe what the state, run by consented-to charismatic leaders, may legitimately do. Locating legitimacy in custom, rule by consented-to leaders and the law, Weber closes his definition of the state by observing that the (now legitimated) ends of society can only be realised through the use of a (now legitimised) monopoly on violence – hence his definition of the state. In Politics as a Vocation, Weber defines his conception of the state as a prelude to the bulk of the lecture (largely concerned with the character and desired characteristics of political systems and politicians.) Choosing to define a state by its means as opposed to its ends, Weber approvingly quotes Trotsky’s observation that “every State is based on force.” However, force is not enough Weber argues that it must (as much for pragmatic as normative reasons) be seen to be legitimate. The second will argue that the Anglo-American contract-based conceptions of sovereignty implicitly contest Weber’s, and that neither conception rules out the possibility of state terrorism. The first will accept the accuracy and normative desirability of Weber’s conception of sovereignty while highlighting the scope for illegitimate state violence within this conception. The idea that Weber’s conception of a sovereign state does not preclude the idea of state terrorism will be taken up in two areas. Finally, it will be suggested that while only the most extreme and systemic examples of a state abusing its power could properly be called state terrorism, the concept is not a contradiction in terms when derived from dominant conceptions of sovereignty. Next, two categories of (potential) state terrorism – terror bombing campaigns during the Second World War and revolutionary violence during the consolidation of the French revolution – will be examined as test cases to see if a history-based arguments support the case for state terrorism. To begin with, it will be suggested that neither Weber’s nor a competing conception of sovereignty preclude the possibility of acts of state also being acts of terrorism. A more critical reading, however, reveals several problems with these conceptions. ![]() If we accept these conceptions of sovereignty and terrorism, a reasonable though uncritical reading would suggest that the concept of state terrorism is a contradiction in terms and that the use of violence by a non-state actor cannot but be terrorism. ![]() The central elements (politically motivated violence against non-combatants by non-state actors), for example, would probably be acceptable to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. The German sociologist Max Weber claimed “the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly on legitimate physical violence.” This is essentially a statement about state sovereignty Weber’s definition is hugely influential and has bordered on orthodoxy ever since he suggested it.Ī similarly orthodox conception of terrorism is “ premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatanttargets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Despite the problem of finding an internationally agreed definition of terrorism, this formulation is relatively uncontroversial. How can the actions of states be described as terrorism, given state monopolies on the legitimate use of violence? ![]()
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